# Platform control: boot and entitlements

> You bought the iPhone; Apple still decides which operating system may start. On the Mac, some choices return to the owner at the cost of reduced protection.

Written October 2026. Agenxy — https://agenxy.org/writing/platform-control/

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You own the phone. At startup, it checks for Apple's signature. The published
iPhone design offers no alternative operating system for its owner to choose.
On the Mac, choice is available, with approval, payment or a reduction in
protection attached to some of the routes.

The purchase is complete. Authorisation continues.

## Apple's signature controls the iPhone at startup

The Boot ROM is laid down during chip fabrication with Apple's root public
key. It checks the signature on iBoot; the rest of the chain checks that each
next stage is signed by Apple
([boot description](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secb3000f149/web)).
Failed verification leads to a factory restore using a Mac or PC. The
owner's key is not among the documented alternatives.

For an update, Apple's server receives installation measurements, a random
value against replay and the chip's unique identifier. The resulting
signature belongs to that device; an older installation cannot be copied
across. Apple can stop signing vulnerable releases to prevent downgrade
attacks. An internet connection to the company is always required for updates
to Apple-designed silicon
([update security](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secf683e0b36/web)).

Apple's [provisioning note](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/technotes/tn3125-inside-code-signing-provisioning-profiles)
excepts macOS from its rule that third-party execution must be authorised by
Apple. On a device using a free Apple Account, you may install up to three
apps. Their profiles expire after 7 days
([membership comparison](https://developer.apple.com/support/compare-memberships/)).

Development-signed apps require Developer Mode. Apple says this
"protects people from inadvertently installing potentially harmful
software"
([Developer Mode](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/xcode/enabling-developer-mode-on-a-device)).
The checks have a security purpose. They also leave the choice with Apple.

The [Security Research Device](https://security.apple.com/research-device/)
permits shell access and kernel customisation, with approval, residence in a
listed country and a renewable 12-month loan. The device remains Apple's
property. That is a research programme, not a boot choice supplied with the
phone you bought.

## Mac boot choice is available at a security cost

On an Apple silicon Mac, the owner can set the
[startup policy](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/sec7d92dc49f/web).
Full Security is the default and behaves like iOS and iPadOS. Reduced Security
permits signed macOS versions ever trusted by Apple
([Mac guide](https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/mchl768f7291/mac)).
Permissive Security allows boot objects signed locally by that Mac's Secure
Enclave, including an arbitrary untrusted kernel. Custom XNU kernels remain
unsupported.

Recovery and the owner's password are required to lower the setting.
Disabling System Integrity Protection acknowledges the move to Permissive
Security. The owner can choose the kernel. The machine performs fewer checks.

## Restricted features bring approval back into the system

Ordinary Mac software needs no provisioning profile. Restricted entitlements
do. The profiles use Certificates, Identifiers & Profiles, which free accounts
do not include. Apple Developer Program membership is US$99 a year
([enrolment](https://developer.apple.com/programs/enroll/)).

| Capability | Entitlement | Requirement, in Apple's words |
|---|---|---|
| Endpoint security tools | `com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client` | "You must request this entitlement from Apple." |
| Drivers | `com.apple.developer.driverkit` | "You must request this entitlement from Apple." |
| Virtual machine networking | `com.apple.vm.networking` | "restricted to developers of virtualization software. To request this entitlement, contact your Apple representative." |
| Network extensions, system extensions | `com.apple.developer.networking.networkextension`, `com.apple.developer.system-extension.install` | No checkmark in the free column of the macOS capability table |
| Notarised distribution | Developer ID | "Mac software notarization" not included for free accounts |

The distinctions matter. The
[virtualisation entitlement](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/entitlements/com.apple.security.virtualization)
states no approval condition, unlike virtual-machine networking. Nor is
notarisation an absolute bar to execution: System Settings offers Open Anyway
to override [Gatekeeper](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/gatekeeper-and-runtime-protection-sec5599b66df/web).
Those routes remain available for ordinary independent software.

For DriverKit, Apple explains that valid entitlements protect
"the security or integrity of the system"
([driver permissions](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/driverkit/requesting-entitlements-for-driverkit-development)).
While approval is pending, its
[system-extension guidance](https://developer.apple.com/system-extensions/)
lets you test by turning off System Integrity Protection. On Apple silicon,
that means Permissive Security, which Apple calls "a much more insecure state".

Your driver needs approval to protect the system. Until it arrives, the
published test route removes protection from the system.

## The paid route carries restrictions of its own

Membership brings the
[Developer Program License Agreement](https://developer.apple.com/support/downloads/terms/apple-developer-program/Apple-Developer-Program-License-Agreement-English.pdf).
It prohibits reverse engineering and decompilation except where applicable
law prohibits that restriction; Apple's operating systems may not run on or
in connection with non-Apple-branded devices. Without written permission,
members may not make code that disables or interferes with security, digital
signing, DRM, verification or authentication mechanisms, or enables others
to do so.

Payment supplies eligibility to use the signing service. It also supplies
conditions on investigating the mechanisms that decide eligibility.

## Regulatory action has concentrated on app distribution

The European Commission's DMA decisions cover interoperability with nine iOS
connectivity features and developers' requests
([decisions](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-provides-guidance-under-digital-markets-act-facilitate-development-innovative-products-2025-03-19_en)).
Apple sought annulment of both. A separate €500 million fine concerns
restrictions on directing users outside the App Store
([decision](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1085));
Apple appealed ([DMA report](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2f31180c-b9da-49d4-ae36-3a4109cc59a5_en?filename=CELEX_52026DC0247_EN_TXT.pdf)).

Apple's [EU distribution conditions](https://developer.apple.com/support/dma-and-apps-in-the-eu/)
replace the per-install Core Technology Fee with a 5% commission on digital
sales through apps outside the App Store. Alternative marketplaces still
need Apple authorisation and an eligibility route. One option is a
US$1,000,000 stand-by letter of credit.

Japan's Mobile Software Competition Act also permits alternative marketplaces,
with Apple's authorisation required on iOS 26.2 and later
([Apple's guidance](https://developer.apple.com/support/app-distribution-in-japan/);
[regulator](https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/policy_enforcement/digital/index.html)).
In the UK, the CMA designated Apple as having strategic market status in
mobile platforms. Its published roadmap records no alternative app stores
or direct web installation and says sideloading measures would need careful
consideration of security implications
([case](https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/apples-mobile-platform);
[roadmap](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/687f893cf2ecaeb756d0e1e6/Roadmap__Apple_.pdf)).

These measures address distribution and feature access. None of the pages
examined offers an alternative iPhone operating system. Another place to
obtain apps is not another choice of what boots.

## Malware protection does not settle who must hold the key

An attacker can persuade an owner to authorise harmful code. Signatures
restricted to the maker prevent that attacker from supplying an accepted
signature for unapproved code. Apple's kernel-extension guidance warns of
risks to the system's integrity and reliability
([security guide](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/sec8e454101b/web)).
Local authority must answer those risks.

The Mac already holds a local private signing key inside its Secure Enclave
([boot process](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secac71d5623/web)).
Enabling kernel extensions requires One True Recovery and the owner's
password, making injection by software-only attackers within macOS difficult.
The owner can supply physical presence and the password.

Checking provenance, currency and deliberate consent does not establish that
Apple must be the sole signer. Disabling System Integrity Protection does
make the kernel easier to compromise. The documented route couples local
choice with that loss; these sources neither establish that the coupling is
necessary nor show a shipped owner-key design retaining every protection.

The proposal still needs implementing. The owner's lack of an iPhone boot
choice is already implemented.

## Access to essential computing should preserve security

The student should be able to test a driver without weakening the computer.
Buying an essential tool should not leave permission to study or change it
at its maker's discretion. Agenxy supports absolute sovereignty over your own
device and data.

Agenxy proposes extending the Mac's local-signature principle to drivers and
extensions while retaining other protections. Secure defaults should coexist
with owner authorisation, including the operating system, without vendor
approval or a fee. This applies to every maker. Access to an essential tool
should not require surrendering its protection.

## Sources

The Developer Program agreement was updated on 18 August 2026: section 2.6
covers reverse engineering and non-Apple devices; section 3.2(e) covers
interference with security and verification mechanisms. The free-profile
finding and the restricted-capability finding use Apple's tables together,
not a single statement on free signing.

The Commission decisions are dated 19 March 2025; the fine 23 April 2025;
the DMA report 21 May 2026. The EU fee change applies from 1 October 2026.
Japan's Act took full effect on 18 December 2025. The CMA designation is dated
22 October 2025 and its roadmap July 2025; subsequent CMA action was outside
this review.

 Additional entitlement sources:

- [Endpoint Security](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/entitlements/com.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client).
- [DriverKit](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/entitlements/com.apple.developer.driverkit).
- [vmnet networking](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/entitlements/com.apple.vm.networking).
- [macOS capabilities table](https://developer.apple.com/help/account/reference/supported-capabilities-macos).

Sources were consulted on 10 October 2026.