Agenxy cultivates open technology

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Platform control: boot and entitlements

AbstractYou bought the iPhone; Apple still decides which operating system may start. On the Mac, some choices return to the owner at the cost of reduced protection.

You own the phone. At startup, it checks for Apple’s signature. The published iPhone design offers no alternative operating system for its owner to choose. On the Mac, choice is available, with approval, payment or a reduction in protection attached to some of the routes.

The purchase is complete. Authorisation continues.

Apple’s signature controls the iPhone at startup

The Boot ROM is laid down during chip fabrication with Apple’s root public key. It checks the signature on iBoot; the rest of the chain checks that each next stage is signed by Apple (boot description). Failed verification leads to a factory restore using a Mac or PC. The owner’s key is not among the documented alternatives.

For an update, Apple’s server receives installation measurements, a random value against replay and the chip’s unique identifier. The resulting signature belongs to that device; an older installation cannot be copied across. Apple can stop signing vulnerable releases to prevent downgrade attacks. An internet connection to the company is always required for updates to Apple-designed silicon (update security).

Apple’s provisioning note excepts macOS from its rule that third-party execution must be authorised by Apple. On a device using a free Apple Account, you may install up to three apps. Their profiles expire after 7 days (membership comparison).

Development-signed apps require Developer Mode. Apple says this “protects people from inadvertently installing potentially harmful software” (Developer Mode). The checks have a security purpose. They also leave the choice with Apple.

The Security Research Device permits shell access and kernel customisation, with approval, residence in a listed country and a renewable 12-month loan. The device remains Apple’s property. That is a research programme, not a boot choice supplied with the phone you bought.

Mac boot choice is available at a security cost

On an Apple silicon Mac, the owner can set the startup policy. Full Security is the default and behaves like iOS and iPadOS. Reduced Security permits signed macOS versions ever trusted by Apple (Mac guide). Permissive Security allows boot objects signed locally by that Mac’s Secure Enclave, including an arbitrary untrusted kernel. Custom XNU kernels remain unsupported.

Recovery and the owner’s password are required to lower the setting. Disabling System Integrity Protection acknowledges the move to Permissive Security. The owner can choose the kernel. The machine performs fewer checks.

Restricted features bring approval back into the system

Ordinary Mac software needs no provisioning profile. Restricted entitlements do. The profiles use Certificates, Identifiers & Profiles, which free accounts do not include. Apple Developer Program membership is US$99 a year (enrolment).

CapabilityEntitlementRequirement, in Apple’s words
Endpoint security toolscom.apple.developer.endpoint-security.client“You must request this entitlement from Apple.”
Driverscom.apple.developer.driverkit“You must request this entitlement from Apple.”
Virtual machine networkingcom.apple.vm.networking“restricted to developers of virtualization software. To request this entitlement, contact your Apple representative.”
Network extensions, system extensionscom.apple.developer.networking.networkextension, com.apple.developer.system-extension.installNo checkmark in the free column of the macOS capability table
Notarised distributionDeveloper ID“Mac software notarization” not included for free accounts

The distinctions matter. The virtualisation entitlement states no approval condition, unlike virtual-machine networking. Nor is notarisation an absolute bar to execution: System Settings offers Open Anyway to override Gatekeeper. Those routes remain available for ordinary independent software.

For DriverKit, Apple explains that valid entitlements protect “the security or integrity of the system” (driver permissions). While approval is pending, its system-extension guidance lets you test by turning off System Integrity Protection. On Apple silicon, that means Permissive Security, which Apple calls “a much more insecure state”.

Your driver needs approval to protect the system. Until it arrives, the published test route removes protection from the system.

The paid route carries restrictions of its own

Membership brings the Developer Program License Agreement. It prohibits reverse engineering and decompilation except where applicable law prohibits that restriction; Apple’s operating systems may not run on or in connection with non-Apple-branded devices. Without written permission, members may not make code that disables or interferes with security, digital signing, DRM, verification or authentication mechanisms, or enables others to do so.

Payment supplies eligibility to use the signing service. It also supplies conditions on investigating the mechanisms that decide eligibility.

Regulatory action has concentrated on app distribution

The European Commission’s DMA decisions cover interoperability with nine iOS connectivity features and developers’ requests (decisions). Apple sought annulment of both. A separate €500 million fine concerns restrictions on directing users outside the App Store (decision); Apple appealed (DMA report).

Apple’s EU distribution conditions replace the per-install Core Technology Fee with a 5% commission on digital sales through apps outside the App Store. Alternative marketplaces still need Apple authorisation and an eligibility route. One option is a US$1,000,000 stand-by letter of credit.

Japan’s Mobile Software Competition Act also permits alternative marketplaces, with Apple’s authorisation required on iOS 26.2 and later (Apple’s guidance; regulator). In the UK, the CMA designated Apple as having strategic market status in mobile platforms. Its published roadmap records no alternative app stores or direct web installation and says sideloading measures would need careful consideration of security implications (case; roadmap).

These measures address distribution and feature access. None of the pages examined offers an alternative iPhone operating system. Another place to obtain apps is not another choice of what boots.

Malware protection does not settle who must hold the key

An attacker can persuade an owner to authorise harmful code. Signatures restricted to the maker prevent that attacker from supplying an accepted signature for unapproved code. Apple’s kernel-extension guidance warns of risks to the system’s integrity and reliability (security guide). Local authority must answer those risks.

The Mac already holds a local private signing key inside its Secure Enclave (boot process). Enabling kernel extensions requires One True Recovery and the owner’s password, making injection by software-only attackers within macOS difficult. The owner can supply physical presence and the password.

Checking provenance, currency and deliberate consent does not establish that Apple must be the sole signer. Disabling System Integrity Protection does make the kernel easier to compromise. The documented route couples local choice with that loss; these sources neither establish that the coupling is necessary nor show a shipped owner-key design retaining every protection.

The proposal still needs implementing. The owner’s lack of an iPhone boot choice is already implemented.

Access to essential computing should preserve security

The student should be able to test a driver without weakening the computer. Buying an essential tool should not leave permission to study or change it at its maker’s discretion. Agenxy supports absolute sovereignty over your own device and data.

Agenxy proposes extending the Mac’s local-signature principle to drivers and extensions while retaining other protections. Secure defaults should coexist with owner authorisation, including the operating system, without vendor approval or a fee. This applies to every maker. Access to an essential tool should not require surrendering its protection.

Sources

The Developer Program agreement was updated on 18 August 2026: section 2.6 covers reverse engineering and non-Apple devices; section 3.2(e) covers interference with security and verification mechanisms. The free-profile finding and the restricted-capability finding use Apple’s tables together, not a single statement on free signing.

The Commission decisions are dated 19 March 2025; the fine 23 April 2025; the DMA report 21 May 2026. The EU fee change applies from 1 October 2026. Japan’s Act took full effect on 18 December 2025. The CMA designation is dated 22 October 2025 and its roadmap July 2025; subsequent CMA action was outside this review.

Additional entitlement sources:

Sources were consulted on 10 October 2026.